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ABSTRACT 
One of the biggest challenges currently facing mankind is tackling the challenge of climate 
change. To mitigate this, there have been several multilateral conferences, where some steps 
have been taken. The Copenhagen Summit in 2009 was one such conference, where the 
expectations before the conference were significant. Unfortunately, the conference was later 
described to be a failure. 
This paper uses an event-study methodology to analyse the effect of this unexpected event. 
Portfolios of companies in the coal and solar industries, listed in the United States of America 
and China, are used. The results show that the conference did not have any discernible effect 
on the coal and solar industries in either of the analysed markets. A significant effect was found 
for Chinese Solar, but the economic reasoning behind this change is unsatisfactory.  
There were many events that together thwarted the ability of the conference to get to an 
agreement. Any one event during or before the conference is not likely to have been the direct 
cause of the observed outcome. The inability of this study to unambiguously find evidence of 
the coal and solar industries being affected by the outcome of the conference can perhaps be 
explained by climate change being a natural part of everyday life today. The efforts of top-
level politicians might not have a direct impact on the day-to-day valuation of industries. 
Key words: event study, COP15, stock market, environmental economics, environment. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
For the last decades, climate change has been one of the most pressing and discussed challenges 
facing mankind (Klein, 2014). It has long been established that the trajectory of world 
economic development is not in tune with a long-term sustainable climate situation, and that a 
new economic model is needed (Brundtland & Khalid, 1987). As a result, many of the world's 
leaders and countries are working towards reducing the impact of climate change on future 
generations. Starting with the First World Climate Conference of 1979 in Geneva, the 
international community of nation states started a long path towards negotiating targets and 
actions related to climate change (United Nations, 2017). Several notable conferences and 
outcomes have followed, along with landmark documents and treaties. 
As a result of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created. This document outlines the nature and seriousness 
of the issue and that all countries of the world needs to be part of the solution. It also highlighted 
the important distinction between developing and developed nations, and the responsibilities 
carried by each category of nation. The document also dictated that environmental data should 
be recorded and reported. The document also established the following goal: "[Greenhous gas 
(GHG) concentrations shall be kept] at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
(human induced) interference with the climate system." The UNFCCC has been a fixture 
around which unilateral climate negotiations are centred; at the time of writing, a total of 197 
countries have ratified the convention. (United Nations, 2014) 
The countries which have ratified the convention regularly meet at Conferences of Parties 
(COP) to the UNFCCC; one of which was The Copenhagen Summit (COP15) in 2009. The 
expectations were high that the conference would produce a binding agreement for the post-
2012 period, i.e. the period following the first commitment-period stipulated by the 1997 Kyoto 
protocol (Daniel, 2010). COP15 was called "[the] most important international gathering since 
the Second World War" (Campbell, 2016), and slogans such as "Hopenhagen" and "Seal the 
deal" were used. The summit was also framed strongly with the idea of being time-critical, and 
that it was a "decisive moment", and that "time is running out" (Kunelius & Eide, 2012). The 
conference was also unusual, in that many heads-of-states were to be in attendance during the 
closing days (Daniel, 2010). This made the stakes extraordinarily high from a political 
standpoint (Death, 2011). However, as the conference proceeded, it was becoming ever clearer 
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that no significant breakthrough could be expected. In the last moments of the conference, the 
Copenhagen Accord was crafted through largely closed negotiations between the United States 
of America and the BASIC countries (a block of newly industrialised countries, including 
Brazil, South Africa, India, and China). This accord fell short of the anticipated outcomes of 
the conference, and there was resentment of the way it had been crafted among the conference 
participants (Daniel, 2010). As a result, the Copenhagen Accord was never officially adopted 
as the outcome of the conference, but merely "taken note of" (Daniel, 2010). 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The outcome of the COP15 conference was unexpected, in that it failed to live up to the pre-
conference expectations of a binding agreement for the period after the Kyoto protocol (Daniel, 
2010). Because of the time-critical nature of actions towards the mitigation of climate change 
(Thompson, 2010), and that a failure on such a high inter-governmental level causes severe 
delays for any corrective action (Christoff, 2010), the failure of COP15 could be potentially 
devastating to the ability of the international community to initiate action in this area. 
Therefore, determining just how important the inability to reach an agreement at COP15 was 
for keeping climate change under control is interesting. Other Conferences of the Parties of the 
UNFCCC could also be a focus for investigation, such as COP21 in Paris. However, these 
negotiations did not produce unexpected results compared to expectations going into the 
conferences; at minimum, they were not considered to be clear failures, as the COP15 is 
remembered as being.  
One way to measure how surprising the outcome of COP15 was, is to use the valuation of 
relevant companies on the stock market as proxy. Because stock markets reflect available 
information – at least to some degree – a sudden influx of new information should influence 
the valuation (Campbell et al., 1997). There was a substantial media presence and degree of 
attention around the COP15 conference (Kunelius & Eide, 2012). Because of this attention, the 
stock markets would have had a vast amount of information available about the process, 
projected outcomes, and development of the conference. Therefore, a listed company operating 
in a field likely affected by the outcome of the conference – for example through new emissions 
regulations – could have its valuation altered because of the outcome of the conference. 
1.1.1 Industries affected by the outcome of the COP15 conference 
As the conference concerned climate change policy, industries related to increasing or 
decreasing emissions is of interests. Any new policy change – or probable change in the future 
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– could have a direct effect on such companies: the long-term economic viability of the 
company would change due to new environmental factors (Slack et al., 2010). One of the 
cornerstones of the climate change debate is transitioning to energy sources that carry less 
environment impact and maintain economic viability (Brundtland & Khalid, 1987), making 
companies in the energy sector an attractive entry point.  
One industry which is often mentioned in conjunction with climate change is the coal industry 
(Klein, 2014; Thompson, 2010). In a comparison by Klein & Whalley (2015), coal was 
markedly worse from an environmental sustainability standpoint, compared to all other energy 
sources. The valuation of coal securities could therefore be assumed to be negatively affected 
by advances towards the mitigating climate change: coal-based energy sources are a clear target 
by policy-makers when attempting to reduce GHG-emissions (Klein & Whalley, 2015). 
Conversely, the unexpected failure of COP15 could provide a respite for companies in the 
industry, by postponing new regulation and reduction of subsidies which might have resulted 
from a binding agreement.  
On the other side, there are industries which would be positively affected through emissions 
regulation. For example, an industry which provides less CO2-intensive alternative to a 
competing industry's products could gain competitive power through policy changes which 
target GHG emission reductions. Renewable energy, in contrast to fossil-based energy, provide 
clear advantages from an environmental sustainability standpoint (Klein & Whalley, 2015). 
Solar energy is an interesting energy source to study, as it is comparatively novel, provides 
clear benefits in comparison to coal, and can provide decentralised energy production attractive 
to developing countries. 
1.1.2 Markets affected by the outcome of the COP15 conference 
The backdrop to the COP15 conference was the dichotomy between developing and developed 
countries (Daniel, 2010). Neither the developed countries – among others including the United 
States of America and the European countries – nor the developing countries – including China, 
Brazil, India and many more – provided a homogenous front in the COP15 negotiations: the 
national interests of each individual country manifested in variations in the façade of the two 
negotiating blocks (Daniel, 2010). However, the leaders of respective group are indubitably the 
United States of America and China. These two countries both have vast internal markets, as 
well as being significant contributors to world's GHG emissions each year (Christoff, 2010), 
and occupying the number one and number two positions in total national GDP (The World 
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Bank, 2017). Negotiations within UNFCCC are intrinsically linked to the political moves of 
these two countries (Christoff, 2010). 
China has experienced significant growth since the 1990s. Consequently, the urbanisation and 
industrialisation of the country has grown the country's energy demand (Christoff, 2010). 
Despite the lower per-capita GHG emissions compared to western countries, the populous 
country has thusly become the world’s largest emitter of CO2 (Mizo, 2016). During the past 
decades, the country's increasing energy demand has, to a considerable extent, been covered 
by expansion in fossil energy sources, such as coal (Campbell, 2016). China is also an 
important market for solar cell technology (Mizo, 2016). The country has emerged as the 
world’s largest manufacturer of solar cells (Hughes & Meckling, 2017), and is continually 
working towards adding more renewable energy capacity (Mizo, 2016), being a world leader 
in solar cell deployment (International Energy Agency, 2014). 
The United States of America has been at the forefront of economic development since the start 
of the 20th Century and is an essential actor in world politics. By extension, the actions of the 
country concerning climate change mitigation is of paramount importance (Christoff, 2010). 
The country's energy production has a relatively high dependence on coal, constituting 29.8 
percent of the country's energy mix in 2009 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017). 
In solar energy, the United States of America has not been as impactful as China, but was still 
the 2nd largest OECD country by solar deployment in 2014 (International Energy Agency, 
2014).  
1.2 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is as follows: To investigate if the 2009 United Nations Climate 
Change Conference had any noticeable impact on the valuation of companies in the coal & 
solar industries in China and the United States of America.  
As a path towards answering this purpose, two research questions have been devised. These 
questions will be presented below, along with a justification for their formulation in relation to 
the overarching purpose. 
Economists are often asked to measure the impact of an event. A common method to do so is 
the event-study methodology (Campbell et al., 1997). To test the influence of the COP15 
conference, a multi-country, multi-industry event study will be conducted. The coal and solar 
industries in the United States and China have been selected as the focus for this study. Ex-
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ante, the expectation is that the unexpected results of the COP15 conference will be discernible, 
with the null hypothesis H0: there are no abnormal returns during the period. The first research 
question is: 
I. Using an event study of coal & solar portfolios in the United States and China, can any 
noticeable impact be found from the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference? 
The COP15 conference lasted between 7th December and 18th December 2009. During the 
conference, several noticeable events took place which eventually culminated in the crafting 
of the Copenhagen Accord. As all events during the conference were met with significant 
media attention, the financial markets would be continually infused with information, and the 
security valuations should change accordingly. Because of this, determining the exact moment 
when the market took the conference outcome into account is not clear. The second research 
question is therefore: 
II. What were some notable events during the 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference which contributed to, or signalled, the inability to establish a binding 
agreement? 
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2 LITERATURE STUDY 
The literature study in this section is divided in two parts. The first part covers characteristics 
of event studies relevant to the thesis. After this, an overview of efficient market theory is 
made. 
2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF EVENT STUDIES 
The event-study methodology is commonly used when economist try to determine the effect a 
specific event has on the value of a company (Campbell et al., 1997). One of the earlies example 
of an event study can be found in Dolley (1933a), and the follow-up articles in Dolley (1933b). 
Here, an overview of stock split-ups in the 1920s was made, along with the effect these splits 
had on the valuation of the companies. As the methodology of event study analysis was in its 
infancy, the study reported the effects of the splits on trading volumes around the event, the 
change in number of shareholders, as well as the "price effect" of the splits. The price effect, 
which is what is commonly tested in today's event studies, was reported as the proportion of 
companies where the price increased and decreased. 
Since the early series of papers by Dolley in 1933, the event-study methodology has developed 
significantly in sophistication. Another important series of papers, which compares the 
viability of common event-study methodologies using abnormal returns, are the series of papers 
by Brown and Warner. The abnormal returns tested were the mean adjusted returns, markets 
adjusted returns, and risk adjusted returns (Brown & Warner, 1980). In Brown & Warner 
(1980), tests of these methodologies using monthly stock prices was made, whereas in Brown 
& Warner (1985), a similar procedure was applied to daily data. However, the implementation 
of these methods varies meaningfully between researchers, depending on their view of how the 
power of these types of tests are affected by a number of variables. 
Commonly, event studies conduct statistical tests on so called abnormal returns – the difference 
between observed returns and expected returns according to some model – but the details of 
the methodology of event studies can vary drastically, depending on the assumption made by 
the author regarding the circumstances around the research question in focus. On such aspect 
is the whether to use parametric or non-parametric tests (Brown & Warner, 1980). A simple 
parametric t-test makes a strong assumption that the stock returns are normally distributed: if 
this assumption fails to hold, false inferences might be drawn. Non-parametric tests do not rely 
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on this assumption, which could make them more robust. However, Brown & Warner (1980) 
shows that the parametric tests are reasonably well specified for adequately sized samples. 
One important aspect is the notion of clustering of events. When an event-study considers the 
effect of for example stock splits, stock dividends, etc., the data is collected from several 
temporally separated events: one for each stock. As the timing of these events are not related 
to each other, the event period for each stock is not taking place on the same dates. Therefore, 
external factors, such as political or economic events, will not influence the study in the same 
magnitude as if the event periods would be aligned with each other (Brown & Warner, 1980; 
Campbell et al., 1997). Therefore, if the study has event clustering, some adjustment of the 
methodology can be made to compensate for this (MacKinlay, 1997). Additionally, avoiding 
simple abnormal return models, such as mean adjusted returns, has a positive impact (Brown 
& Warner, 1980). However, regardless of such precautions, clustering does have a negative 
impact on the power of the employed tests, causing over-rejection of the null hypothesis (Kolari 
& Pynnönen, 2010). 
2.2 EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS 
That a market is efficient means that it will react to new information that was not available 
before, and adjust the prices of assets according to this infusion. For a perfectly efficient 
market, all actors have access to all available information without any time delay, meaning that 
asset prices always perfectly reflect available information. By extension, this leads to an 
impossibility of making any economic profit by trading on efficient markets, as all market 
participants always react to the same available information. The existence of trading profits 
can therefore be used as an indicator of market efficiency: as the trading profits increases, the 
efficiency of the market decreases. In the real world, there will rarely be perfect information 
available to all participants at every time instance. Some actors might also have private 
information, which is not shared with all other actors. Additionally, there will be a time lag 
between the release of information and the moment when a majority of the market actors are 
able to respond to novel information. (Campbell et al., 1997) 
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Therefore, the efficiency of a market is related to the information set available to the actors. 
Commonly, the three forms of market efficiency are: (i) weak-form efficiency, where the only 
information is the historic prices and returns; (ii) semistrong-form efficiency, where the 
information set includes all publicly available information; and (iii) strong-form efficiency, 
where the information set also includes private information. (Campbell et al., 1997) 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used to answer the purpose of this thesis is divided in two parts. These parts 
follow from the research questions used in this paper. 
3.1 EVENT STUDY DETAILS 
To be able to answer the second research question, an event study has been conducted. In short, 
the event-study tests for whether a specific event have led to any abnormal returns on security 
prices. In this context, abnormal means returns which differ significantly from what is normally 
expected, where the normality benchmark is determined by a certain model (Brown & Warner, 
1980). In this chapter, the methodological choices related to the event study are outlined. 
3.1.1 Time-windows used in the event study 
Following the event-study methodology, a number of time-windows is to be specified. These 
include the estimation window, the event window, and the post-event window (Campbell et 
al., 1997). Figure 1 is adapted from Campbell et al. (1997) shows the relative positioning of 
these time-windows. The time windows used in this study can be seen in  
Table 1. 
 
Figure 1 - Time-windows 
The estimation window is used for determining the expected – or normal – returns for the 
securities. Two different estimation windows have been defined for this study: one long and 
one short. The long estimation window starts on 1st December 2008 and ends on 22nd October 
2009. This longer estimation window included a gap between the start of the conference and 
the end of the estimation window. This is sometimes done to avoid the event itself from 
influencing the estimation of normal returns. The shorter estimation window starts on 15th July 
2009 and ends 4th December 2009. This shorter estimation window has been selected so as to 
be as close as possible to the event itself. This shorter estimation window is included to – as 
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much as possible – reduce any confounding influence on the result from the 2008 financial 
collapse. In this study, the results of both these estimation windows will be reported. 
Table 1 - Time-windows of this paper 
 Start date End date Calendar days Weekdays 
Short 
Estimation 
Window 
2009-07-15 (T0) 2009-12-04 (T1) 142 days 102 days 
Long Estimation 
Window 
2008-12-01 (T0) 2009-10-22 (T1) 325 days 233 days 
Event Window 2009-12-07 2009-12-18 (T2) 11 days 9 days 
Post-event 
Window 
2009-12-19 2010-02-01 (T3) 44 days 30 days 
 
Our event window follows the duration of the conference, which started 7th December 2009 
and ended 18th December 2009. The day defined as T=0 is 18th December 2009, which is the 
last day of the conference and the day on which the Copenhagen Accord was presented.  
3.1.2 Selection of securities 
Four different portfolios have been constructed to examine the effect of the Copenhagen 
conference. The portfolios are created by combinations of two dimensions. The portfolios and 
their respective combinations, as well as the number of companies in each portfolio, are shown 
in Table 2. 
The first dimension used for the portfolio construction is the country of incorporation. In this 
paper, the securities included are either incorporated in the United States of America or China. 
These two countries are chosen to be representative for developed and developing countries, 
respectively. The countries are also chosen because of the level of contribution to global 
emissions and because they are powerful actors on the global political scene. 
The second dimension used to construct the portfolios is the industry: the securities chosen are 
either in the coal or solar market. We chose these markets since solar companies represent an 
industry which are predicted to be positively impacted by positive news from the Copenhagen 
conference, while the coal companies should get a positive effect if the conference failed to 
achieve any progress. Many listed companies have diversified revenue streams, stemming from 
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different industries. As an example, companies in the coal industry might also have investments 
and revenue from other mining operations – such as metal mining – which, in comparison to 
coal, should be comparatively less effected by happenings in the international climate change 
debate. Therefore, the portfolio companies have been chosen so that they had a majority of 
their revenue from either coal or solar in the year around the conference. In addition, companies 
with operations closer to manufacturing or raw material supply were preferred, as they were 
assumed to be more directly affected by events related to the industry, compared to companies 
further down in the value chain which can be more diversified.  Following this reasoning, a 
choice was made to remove energy companies from either industry. Energy companies can 
adapt their energy generation procedure without affecting their core business of energy 
delivery. In comparison, coal mining companies and solar panel manufacturers are more 
exposed, as they are reliant on the underlying demand for their respective product. 
Table 2 - Portfolio combinations 
 
United States 
of America 
China 
Coal 
Portfolio US-C 
12 companies 
Portfolio C-C 
24 companies 
Solar 
Portfolio US-S 
9 companies 
Portfolio C-S 
10 companies 
 
To find information about companies, we used the Bloomberg terminal in the finance lab at 
Handelshögskolan. In compiling a list of potential companies to include in each portfolio, we 
used a range of sources, including MarketLine Industry profiles of the coal and solar markets 
in the United States of America and China, published research, and online searches. However, 
most of the companies were found using the industry overview functions of the Bloomberg 
terminal. A list of the companies included in each portfolio can be found in Appendix I through 
IV. 
For each potential company, the corresponding security ticker was investigated through 
Bloomberg. Three aspects were investigated for each security, before they were allowed to be 
included in any portfolio. Firstly, for each company, the country of incorporation, as well as 
which stock exchange the company was listed on, was collected. As previously mentioned, 
only Chinese and US companies were included in the study. Some Chinese companies included 
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are listed on a US stock exchange. Secondly, the security should have been actively traded in 
the period surrounding the COP15 conference. At minimum, each security should have had an 
initial public offering (IPO) before the start of the estimation window. Furthermore, the 
selected securities should be actively traded on the market during the period. No formal active-
trading limit was used; instead, a visual inspection was done of the day-to-day security prices 
as reported by Bloomberg's graph function: securities with extended periods of stationary 
prices were excluded. Thirdly, each company's industry revenue was investigated. Using the 
finance analysis function in Bloomberg, the revenue of each company for 2009, along with the 
percentage of revenue stemming from the industry, was collected. For each included security, 
at least 60 percent of the revenue should originate from either solar or coal for the revenue year 
of 2009. 
For each of the securities selected in this way, the last price trading data was collected for the 
period between 2008-12-01 and 2010-02-01. The last price is the closing price for the security 
for each day, i.e. the last price for which a security was traded during the day. In addition to 
the security last-price data, three market indices were collected for the same period. These 
indices were the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SHCOMP), the Hong Kong 
Hang Seng Index (HSI) and the S&P 500 Index (SPX). These indexes were used to determine 
expected returns, where all securities were compared to the market where they were listed. 
Chinese companies listed in the United States were thus compared to the S&P 500 Index 
instead of one of the two Chinese indices. All security and index last-price data was extracted 
through Bloomberg. For the sake of brevity, the raw data will not be presented in this thesis. 
3.1.3 Adjusting for missing returns 
Not all securities included in our portfolios were traded on every day in our time windows. The 
intra-trade gaps that do exist are frequently only a day or two. However, there are methods 
available to adjust for such missing data points. The method used in this thesis is the lumped 
return procedure, as defined by Maynes & Rumsey (1993). This method works reasonably well 
for thickly and moderately thinly traded stocks (Maynes & Rumsey, 1993). The lumped return 
procedure works by distributing the returns of the next traded day over the non-trade days 
(Maynes & Rumsey, 1993). 
Another point to take note of is that the data set is only adjusted for non-trading days when the 
corresponding stock market is open. That is, no adjustments are made over holidays and other 
times when the overall stock market is not trading. 
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3.1.4 Measuring abnormal returns 
In the event-study in this paper, the market-adjusted returns model, as specified by Brown & 
Warner (1985), is used to determine the abnormal returns during the event window. In this 
method, an OLS regression is done for each individual security, where the day-to-day return 
of the security is regressed on the day-to-day return of the market. 
In this study, the simple returns model is used to the day-to-day returns (see Equation 1). Some 
researchers chose to use logarithmic returns instead of simple returns. However, using this 
methodology in samples with high variance will reduce the expected returns (Hudson & 
Gregoriou, 2015). Generally, the choice of returns model is not critical, but comparisons across 
returns models should be done with caution (Hudson & Gregoriou, 2015). 
Equation 1 - Simple returns 
𝑅𝑖𝑡1 =
𝑃𝑖𝑡1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑡0
𝑃𝑖𝑡0
 
For each security, the market return is chosen to be a corresponding index of the stock market 
in which the security is listed. The alpha and beta estimators for each security is calculated 
according to Equation 2 and Equation 3, following the methodology of MacKinlay (1997). 
Note that these regressions are done on the returns in the estimation window. 
Equation 2 - Beta estimator 
?̂?𝑖 =
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝜏 − ?̂?𝑖)
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
(𝑅𝑚𝜏 − ?̂?𝑚)
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝜏 − ?̂?𝑚)2
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
 
Equation 3 - Alpha estimator 
?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑚 
For each security, the abnormal returns are calculated based on the difference between the 
predicted day-to-day return – based on the regression model – and the observed day-to-day 
return. Because the event dates for all securities are the same, we have event date clustering. 
To adjust for this, the abnormal returns for all securities in each portfolio is summed to one 
aggregated portfolio return for each day (Equation 4). The variance of the abnormal returns is 
estimated using the unbiased estimator (Equation 5), where L1 is the length of the estimation 
window. 
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Equation 4 - Portfolio return 
𝜀?̂?𝜏 =∑𝜀?̂?𝜏
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Equation 5 - Variance estimator 
?̂?𝜀𝑝
2 =  
1
𝐿1 − 2
∑ |?̂?𝑝𝜏 − ?̂?𝜀𝑝|
2
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
 
The variance of the abnormal returns can be approximated with Equation 5, as the variance 
introduced by the sampling error approaches zero asymptotically as the size of L1 increases 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  
3.1.5 Testing the null hypothesis 
Under the null hypothesis, H0, that there are no abnormal returns (neither positive nor negative), 
the distribution of abnormal returns is approximately normally distributed with parameters as 
in Equation 6 (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Equation 6 - Distribution of abnormal returns 
𝜀𝑝𝜏~𝑁 (0, 𝜎
2(𝜀𝑝)) 
It can be difficult to pinpoint the exact date of an event when it comes to event studies (Brown 
& Warner, 1980). This is because it can be hard to know the precise moment when the 
information reached the market, i.e. when the price of the security adjusted to reflect the new 
situation. Furthermore, not all actors on the market receive information on the exact same time. 
Even though the internet has increased the speed of which information is spread, information 
might be released to a small sub-set of the population before it becomes public knowledge. 
Because of this, the abnormal returns of multi-day spans around an event are usually tested. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) between t1 and t2 is defined according to Equation 7 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The variance of CARp approaches Equation 8 asymptotically as L1 
increases. In words, this expression is equal to the number of days in the event window 
multiplied by the variance of the abnormal returns, which we estimate from the estimation 
window portfolio abnormal returns. 
Equation 7 - Cumulative Abnormal Return (of portfolio) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑝(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = ∑ 𝜀𝑝𝜏
𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
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Equation 8 - Variance of Cumulative Abnormal Return 
𝜎𝑝
2(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = (𝜏2 − 𝜏1 + 1)𝜎𝜀𝑝
2  
To test H0, the crude dependency adjustment test is used. This test relates the cumulative 
abnormal return to the standard deviation of the abnormal return, as seen in Equation 9 
(Campbell et al., 1997). 
Equation 9 - Parametric test of H0 
𝜃 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑝(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
𝜎𝑝(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
=
∑ 𝜀𝑝𝜏
𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
√𝑁𝜎𝜀𝑝
 
The distribution of the test statistic is also approximately normally distributed, as it approaches 
this distribution asymptotically with increasing length of L1 (MacKinlay, 1997). 
3.1.6 Selection of CAR-windows 
Five CAR-windows have been chosen inside the event window, where the null hypothesis will 
be tested. The windows follow from the results of research questions II, which is presented in 
Chapter 4.2. The CAR-windows used are presented in Table 3. A justification for choosing 
these windows will now follow. 
Firstly, the last day of the conference is a natural inclusion (defined as day 0 in our results). 
This was the final day of negotiation, and when the Copenhagen Accord was presented. As it 
might have taken the markets some time to interpret the results of the conference, the following 
trading day is included in this time window. As the 18th is a Friday, the following trading day 
is on the Monday 21st December. This will leave the markets ample time to digest the 
unexpected nature of the outcome. 
Secondly, a CAR-window covering the entire conference period is included. The test statistic 
continues to be well-specified even under such longer time-windows (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
However, the power of the test is reduced when longer time-periods are used (Brown & 
Warner, 1985).  
Thirdly, the leak of The Danish Text during the opening days of the conference is an early 
indicator that there were conflicts already going into the conference. The text further 
emphasised the fault lines which existed between the developed and developing countries, right 
at the start of the negotiations (Christoff, 2010). Therefore, the leak of this document, as well 
as the following trading day, is of interest. 
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Fourthly, there were a number of protests marches in Copenhagen (van der Zee & McKie, 
2009). The public pressure was substantial before the conference (Kunelius & Eide, 2012), so 
large and visible protests might have served to pressure the representatives to sign a binding 
agreement. A large protest on 12th December, gathering approximately 100,000 protesters, as 
well as the large number of arrests on the 14th December are chosen as indicators of the people's 
impatience. 
Lastly, in the final days of the conference, it was becoming clear that the elevated expectations 
going into the conference were not to be fulfilled. A CAR window covering these last trading 
days are therefore of interest. 
In addition to the multi-day CAR windows, the one-day CAR values were also calculated for 
all days of the conference, as well as the post-event window. Inflections based on these results 
should be made with caution, as one cannot be certain that the information of an event has 
disseminated thoroughly. Therefore, these results carry less weight in our analysis compared 
to the multi-day results. The results of the one-day CAR windows are presented in Chapter 
4.1.3, except the one-day CAR values in the post-event window, which are presented in 
Appendix V through VIII. 
Table 3 - Chosen CAR windows 
Event Start day* End day* Start-date End-date 
Copenhagen 
Accord released 
0 1 2009-12-18 2009-12-21 
Entire 
Copenhagen 
Summit 
-9 0 2009-12-07 2009-12-18 
Leak of the 
Danish Text 
-8 -7 2009-12-08 2009-12-09 
Public protests -5 -3 2009-12-11 2009-12-15 
Final days of 
the conference 
-3 0 2009-12-15 2009-12-18 
*) Relative to the last day of the Conference   
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3.2 ANALYSIS OF MAJOR HAPPENINGS DURING THE COPENHAGEN 
CONFERENCE 
Information about the events during the Copenhagen conference were gathered through peer-
reviewed papers, as well as through newspaper articles. The peer-reviewed articles reflect the 
post-conference perception, whereas the newspaper articles capture the day-to-day 
developments. The newspaper articles were found by searching the webpage of The Guardian 
(theguardian.com) via a tailored google search. In this thesis, the stock markets in China and 
the United States of America are assumed to follow the semistrong-form market efficiency, i.e. 
reacting to publicly available information. The Guardian was chosen as an indicator of the 
available information set, as the newspaper had sufficient journalistic resources to cover the 
conference proceedings, and a worldwide audience. 
The search term included "Copenhagen" and "conference", and was limited to the days of the 
conference (7th December to 18th December). The search method returned a total of 91 
newspaper articles. From this sample, articles relevant to the purpose of this thesis were 
selected and summarised. After this, a list of notable events was compiled for each day of the 
conference. The events deemed by the authors to carry the highest importance are presented in 
Chapter 4.2 of this paper. 
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4 RESULTS 
In this chapter, the results stemming from the thesis’s methodology is included. First, an 
overview of notable events during the COP15 conference is presented, followed by the results 
of the event study. 
4.1 STATISTICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter, our results of our industry-country portfolios will be presented. The results for 
all five CAR windows are represented, as well as their respective significance levels. For all 
portfolios, both the 233-days estimation window and the 102-days estimation window results 
are reported. In addition to this, the one-day CAR-windows are reported for each day of the 
event, i.e. from 7th December to 21st December. The results for the post-event period are 
presented in Appendix V through VIII. 
4.1.1 Results with short estimation window 
The sum of the cumulative abnormal return for each portfolio, using the short estimation 
window, can be seen in Table 4. 
Table 4 - CAR values with short estimation window 
CAR Portfolio US-C Portfolio US-S Portfolio C-C Portfolio C-S 
( 0, 1) -0.189 0.301 -0.477 -0.024 
(-9, 0) 0.831 0.872 -0.345 0.359 
(-8,-7) 0.116 0.139 0.129 -0.135 
(-5,-3) 0.367 0.032 -0.188 0.678* 
(-3, 0) 0.459 0.099 0.352 0.035 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
The test statistic, along with the corresponding p-value, for each portfolio and CAR-window, 
using the short estimation window, can be seen in Table 5. 
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Table 5 - Test statistics with short estimation window 
 
Portfolio US-C Portfolio US-S Portfolio C-C Portfolio C-S 
CAR t-value p-value t-value p-value t-value p-value t-value p-value 
( 0, 1) -0.773 0.440 1.056 0.291 -1.246 0.213 -0.080 0.936 
(-9, 0) 1.518 0.129 1.369 0.171 -0.403 0.687 0.545 0.586 
(-8,-7) 0.475 0.635 0.488 0.626 0.337 0.736 -0.458 0.647 
(-5,-3) 1.225 0.221 0.091 0.927 -0.401 0.689 1.883 0.060* 
(-3, 0) 1.327 0.184 0.246 0.806 0.650 0.516 0.085 0.932 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
4.1.2 Results with long estimation window 
The sum of the cumulative abnormal return for each portfolio, using the long estimation 
window, can be seen in Table 6. 
Table 6 - CAR values with long estimation window 
CAR Portfolio US-C Portfolio US-S Portfolio C-C Portfolio C-S 
( 0, 1) -0.213 0.280 -0.545 -0.071 
(-9, 0) 0.631 0.743 -0.658 0.015 
(-8,-7) 0.071 0.129 0.047 -0.206 
(-5,-3) 0.313 -0.032 -0.251 0.575 
(-3, 0) 0.371 0.081 0.179 -0.107 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
The test statistic, along with the corresponding p-value, for each portfolio and CAR-window, 
using the long estimation window, can be seen in Table 7. 
Table 7 - Test statistics with long estimation window 
 
Portfolio US-C Portfolio US-S Portfolio C-C Portfolio C-S 
CAR t-value p-value t-value p-value t-value p-value t-value p-value 
( 0, 1) -0.493 0.622 0.622 0.534 -1.061 0.289 -0.147 0.883 
(-9, 0) 0.653 0.514 0.737 0.461 -0.573 0.566 0.014 0.989 
(-8,-7) 0.163 0.870 0.286 0.775 0.092 0.927 -0.424 0.672 
(-5,-3) 0.592 0.554 -0.058 0.954 -0.399 0.690 0.968 0.333 
(-3, 0) 0.607 0.544 0.127 0.899 0.246 0.805 -0.156 0.876 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
20 
 
4.1.3  One-day CAR windows 
In addition to the tests conducted on the specified CAR-windows, the one-day car windows for 
each day of the event is also reported. The corresponding values and significance levels for 
each portfolio can be seen in Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. 
Table 8 - One-day car windows for US Coal 
Portfolio US-C Short est. Window Long est. Window 
Date Event day CAR T-value P-value CAR T-value P-value 
2009-12-21 1 -0.113 -0.653 0.514 -0.123 -0.402 0.688 
2009-12-18 0 -0.076 -0.440 0.660 -0.090 -0.296 0.767 
2009-12-17 -1 0.121 0.698 0.485 0.090 0.295 0.768 
2009-12-16 -2 0.200 1.155 0.248 0.181 0.595 0.552 
2009-12-15 -3 0.215 1.241 0.214 0.190 0.623 0.533 
2009-12-14 -4 0.241 1.390 0.164 0.228 0.747 0.455 
2009-12-11 -5 -0.088 -0.510 0.610 -0.104 -0.343 0.732 
2009-12-10 -6 0.099 0.572 0.567 0.085 0.279 0.780 
2009-12-09 -7 0.109 0.628 0.530 0.093 0.304 0.761 
2009-12-08 -8 0.008 0.044 0.965 -0.022 -0.072 0.943 
2009-12-07 -9 0.004 0.021 0.983 -0.018 -0.061 0.952 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
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Table 9 - One-day car windows for US Solar 
Portfolio US-S Short est. Window Long est. Window 
Date Event day CAR T-value P-value CAR T-value P-value 
2009-12-21 1 0.292 1.448 0.148 0.270 0.848 0.396 
2009-12-18 0 0.009 0.046 0.963 0.011 0.034 0.973 
2009-12-17 -1 0.002 0.008 0.994 0.006 0.018 0.985 
2009-12-16 -2 -0.009 -0.043 0.966 -0.022 -0.069 0.945 
2009-12-15 -3 0.097 0.482 0.630 0.086 0.272 0.786 
2009-12-14 -4 0.032 0.159 0.874 -0.004 -0.013 0.989 
2009-12-11 -5 -0.097 -0.482 0.630 -0.114 -0.359 0.719 
2009-12-10 -6 0.419 2.079 0.038** 0.395 1.243 0.214 
2009-12-09 -7 0.182 0.901 0.367 0.180 0.566 0.572 
2009-12-08 -8 -0.043 -0.212 0.832 -0.051 -0.161 0.872 
2009-12-07 -9 0.280 1.390 0.165 0.256 0.806 0.420 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
Table 10 - One-day car windows for Chinese Coal 
Portfolio C-C Short est. Window Long est. Window 
Date Event day CAR T-value P-value CAR T-value P-value 
2009-12-21 1 -0.171 -0.632 0.527 -0.185 -0.511 0.609 
2009-12-18 0 -0.306 -1.130 0.258 -0.360 -0.992 0.321 
2009-12-17 -1 0.105 0.387 0.699 0.048 0.132 0.895 
2009-12-16 -2 0.156 0.577 0.564 0.127 0.349 0.727 
2009-12-15 -3 0.397 1.467 0.142 0.364 1.005 0.315 
2009-12-14 -4 -0.631 -2.334 0.020** -0.631 -1.740 0.082* 
2009-12-11 -5 0.047 0.173 0.862 0.016 0.043 0.966 
2009-12-10 -6 -0.114 -0.421 0.674 -0.129 -0.357 0.721 
2009-12-09 -7 0.131 0.486 0.627 0.086 0.236 0.813 
2009-12-08 -8 -0.002 -0.009 0.993 -0.038 -0.106 0.916 
2009-12-07 -9 -0.127 -0.470 0.638 -0.140 -0.387 0.699 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
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Table 11 - One-day CAR windows for Chinese Solar 
Portfolio C-S Short est. Window Long est. Window 
Date Event day CAR T-value P-value CAR T-value P-value 
2009-12-21 1 0.139 0.669 0.504 0.119 0.347 0.728 
2009-12-18 0 -0.163 -0.782 0.434 -0.190 -0.556 0.579 
2009-12-17 -1 -0.081 -0.391 0.696 -0.127 -0.371 0.711 
2009-12-16 -2 -0.043 -0.204 0.838 -0.074 -0.217 0.829 
2009-12-15 -3 0.322 1.547 0.122 0.284 0.830 0.407 
2009-12-14 -4 0.365 1.752 0.080* 0.334 0.977 0.329 
2009-12-11 -5 -0.008 -0.038 0.970 -0.043 -0.126 0.900 
2009-12-10 -6 -0.345 -1.657 0.098* -0.373 -1.091 0.275 
2009-12-09 -7 -0.097 -0.465 0.642 -0.124 -0.363 0.717 
2009-12-08 -8 -0.038 -0.183 0.855 -0.082 -0.238 0.812 
2009-12-07 -9 0.446 2.144 0.032** 0.410 1.199 0.230 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
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4.2 OVERVIEW OF EVENTS DURING THE COPENHAGEN SUMMIT 
As previously mentioned, the COP15 conference in Copenhagen carried with it high hopes of 
substantial progress in the battle against climate change (Christoff, 2010; Daniel, 2010). 
However, despite the media focus and political posturing, the conference failed to produce the 
planned outcome (Christoff, 2010). There were events leading up to, as well as during, the 
conference, which lead to this unexpected outcome. 
On 7th December, the first day of the conference, a shared editorial was published in 56 
newspapers from around the world, outlining why it was important that the conference 
produced an agreement. The editorial states that few believe that the COP15 can actually 
produce such an agreement, and discusses the environmental implications the world is and will 
be facing, highlighting problems such as ever-cheaper flights and the developing world having 
to increase their emissions to increase their wealth. The editorial also urges the politicians to 
dedicate themselves to the task of getting to an agreement, wanting them to understand the 
importance and criticality of the task at hand. (The Guardian, 2009a) 
On 8th December, a text called The Danish text was leaked. This text outlined how the 
organisers should try to make the developing countries accept more responsibility for global 
emissions, and adapt higher emission reductions. This was very controversial, since the Kyoto 
protocol – which only included targets for developed countries – put emphasis on the historic 
responsibility the developed countries had for the cumulated environmental damages: these 
countries had caused large amount of the aggregated pollutions and should therefore be 
burdened with most of the immediate mitigation actions. The developing countries had 
permission to continue increasing their emissions, since they needed to expand their economy 
and quality-of-life of their citizens. (Vidal, 2009a) 
Vidal (2009a) summarizes The Danish text thusly: 
1. “Force developing countries to agree to specific emission cuts and measures that were 
not part of the original UN agreement” 
2. “Divide poor countries further by creating a new category of developing countries 
called ‘the most vulnerable’” 
3. “Weaken the UN's role in handling climate finance” 
4. “Not allow poor countries to emit more than 1.44 tonnes of carbon per person by 2050, 
while allowing rich countries to emit 2.67 tonnes” 
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Allegedly, the text was supposed to be used as a guideline in negotiation and work sessions at 
the start of the conference. Afterwards, when the higher-level political leaders joined the 
conference, they would finalize the agreement. The text also includes numbers on emission 
reduction targets how much the developing countries should get in subsidies from the richer 
countries to help them with their reductions. (Vidal, 2009a) 
On the 9th of December, an article where Lumumba Di-Aping, who is the chairman for G77 
which is a group of 132 developing countries, was interviewed by The Guardian. In this article, 
he spoke out about The Danish Text and how unfair it is to developing countries. He said "The 
text robs developing countries of their just and equitable and fair share of the atmospheric 
space. It tries to treat rich and poor countries as equal." (Vidal, 2009b) 
On the 12th of December, a large Protest took place in Copenhagen, where the protesters wanted 
to urge the politicians to reach an agreement. The Danish police estimated that 30 000 people 
joined the protest. But around 700 of the protesters were arrested by the police for either 
throwing rocks or masking their faces, both actions which are in violation of Danish law. At 
the same time the biggest political figures were about to join the conference – now on its last 
part – such as Barack Obama, Gordon Brown and Wen Jiabao. Even after the rocky start of the 
conference, they were able to release a document with different reductions for the developed 
and developing countries. Just as the Kyoto Protocol the developed countries are supposed to 
take the largest share of reduction and the developing countries a smaller one. Unfortunately, 
there is nothing written about the actual quantity of subsidies the developed countries are 
supposed to give to the developing countries to help them with their emission reductions. (van 
der Zee & McKie, 2009) 
On the 15th of December, another protest happened and 194 protesters were arrested, they had 
set fire to barricades and thrown fire bombs. To handle this situation the riot police used tear 
gas. Since the conference started over 1500 arrests had been done and the Danish police has 
gotten a lot of complaints from how they have handled the situation. (van der Zee, 2009)  
Also on the 15th of December, there was a setback in the conference, where about five hours 
were lost when a group of African developing countries accused the developed countries for 
trying to get rid of their obligations to the Kyoto protocol. The developed countries on the other 
hand wants the developing countries to be responsible, mainly China and India both whose 
greenhouse emissions have steadily grown. The conference now had two drafts, one that is 
more aligned with the Kyoto protocol the other is more of a break away. Su Wei that is one of 
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China's negotiator said that: “Developed nations won't come to the table with real numbers. 
That is the main obstacle preventing progress”, the rift between the developed and developing 
countries has widened. At the same time the Obama administrations has both given a promise 
of funding for green technology and they sent more people to negotiate an agreement. (Vidal 
et al., 2009a)  
On the 16th of December, the conference had met many set-backs and was said to be 18 hours 
behind schedule, as the world leaders were about to arrive. After two years of planning and 
being such an important event, people all around the globe were concerned that the conference 
was heading for a failure. It appeared that there was still a big rift between the developed and 
developing countries that was halting the process, with the developed countries arguing that 
China and India needs to take responsibility for their emissions. They also argue that the world 
was not the same as in 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was signed. (Vidal & Stratton, 2009) 
On the 18th of December, the last day of the conference, Obama made a speech at the morning 
before the last discussions, where he spoke about how the world’s countries needed to come to 
an agreement, how the US needs to take their responsibility for being the second largest emitter, 
and that managing the environmental damages that had already been done was a big challenge. 
He ended his speech with: “We must choose action over inaction; the future over the past – 
with courage and faith, let us meet our responsibility to our people, and to the future of our 
planet.” (The Guardian, 2009b) 
On the 18th of December, right after the conference were finished, it was said that this was a 
vital step towards the future and even if it was a difficult conference, it was still a good start. 
Lumamba Di-Aping did not agree with this and said: “The lowest level of ambition you can 
imagine. It's nothing short of climate change scepticism in action. It locks countries into a cycle 
of poverty for ever. Obama has eliminated any difference between him and Bush.” The head 
of Greenpeace in the UK stated: “The city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight, with the 
guilty men and women fleeing to the airport. (…) It is now evident that mitigating global 
warming will require a radically different model of politics than the one on display here in 
Copenhagen.” Lastly Lydia Baker from Save the Children claimed that the world leaders 
“effectively signed a death warrant for many of the world's poorest children. Up to 250,000 
children from poor communities could die before the next major meeting in Mexico at the end 
of next year.” It is quite clear that there was a clear difference between the two groups’ 
experience of the conference. (Vidal et al., 2009b) 
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5 ANALYSIS 
In the analysis, we will analyse our statistical findings and the different events during the 
COP15 conference and how we think they effected the conference. 
5.1 STATISTICAL FINDINGS  
In Table 4 - CAR values with short estimation window and Table 5 - Test statistics with short 
estimation window, we can see that the CAR-value of the protest is significant at the ten percent 
level when it comes to the Chinese solar market under the short estimation window. This date 
is included in the CAR-window covered by the "public protests". Looking closer at the one-
day CAR values, we can see that both Chinese solar and Chinese coal have significant effects 
on 14th December. To see if there were any confounding events taking place in China at the 
same time, a search of The Guardian was done for the dates between 12th and 14th December 
with the search terms china, solar, coal, and energy. We were unable to find any information 
which would explain any changes based on this search method. The sign of the coal portfolio 
is negative, while the sign of the solar portfolio is positive. Looking on the corresponding 
values of the US portfolios under the short estimation window, we can see no effect for the 
solar industry (with a p-value of 0.927). The effect on the coal market is more pronounced, 
albeit not significant at the ten percent level, and carries a positive sign. 
Other events in Table 4 and Table 5 show no significant effects for any of the portfolios. The 
lack of significant effects continues in Table 6 - CAR values with long estimation window and 
Table 7 - Test statistics with long estimation window, which show results under the long 
estimation window: there are no significant effect in either market or industry. The one-day 
cars under the long estimation window only have a significant effect on 14th December: 
Chinese coal.  
Lastly, we can look at Table 8 through Table 11, where we can see if we have any significant 
effects on each day for our four portfolios. If we start by exanimating the first table that contains 
data about the US coal market, there are no significant effects on any day. Then we can look at 
Table 9 and see that we have one significant effect at the five percent level in the US solar, the 
date is 10th December. We cannot find anything major happening during this date. If we now 
look at Table 10 and Table 11, which contains information about the Chinese coal and solar 
respectively, we can observe three significant days. In Table 10, there are significant effects on 
14th of December for both the short and long estimation windows, at five percent significance 
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level with the short and ten percent level with the long estimation window. Lastly, in Table 11, 
three significant effect were found: the 14th, the 10th and the 7th, the first two in the ten percent 
level and the last one in the five percent level. These dates are only significant when useing the 
short estimation window. 
5.2 EVENTS EFFECTING THE CONFERENCE 
If we start from the beginning when discussing the event, the expectations was high and many 
wanted the event to be a success, we can just look at the editorial. Many different new papers 
from different political backgrounds and countries all stood together to show that the world 
leaders that this is what the people wanted, a united force against climate change. This could 
have made it more possible for an agreement to be made.  
When the event started, it did not take long before the first setback. When the Danish text was 
leaked, the conference had hardly started and the divide between the developing countries and 
developed countries had become even more pronounced. This could easily be the start towards 
them not reaching an agreement since the text had a strong contrast if you compare it to the 
Kyoto protocol.  
The next notable event was when Lumumba Di-Aping spoke out against the organizers and 
developed countries about The Danish text. Since he is a big role-model for many developing 
countries, him speaking out against the conference probably made the divide bigger between 
the rich and poor countries and that probably made it more difficult to reach an agreement.  
After this there was the start of the biggest protest around the event and many of the protesters 
was arrested by the police. The protest was as stated before meant to urge the politicians to 
come to an agreement. We hope that a protest as big as this one would help the politicians to 
reach an agreement. 
Another problem for the conference was when the debate was delayed by five hours when a 
group of developing countries claimed that the developed countries wanted to get rid of the 
Kyoto protocol. This and the fact that two drafts were being made, one more in line with the 
Kyoto protocol and one more aligned with The Danish text. All of this effected the discussions 
negatively and made the divide between richer and poorer countries bigger which could stop 
an agreement from being made.  
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When the world leaders were about to join the conference, they were 16 hours after schedule 
in the discussions and we believe that it is impossible to come to an agreement with that little 
time left and especially with the giant gap between the developed and developing countries. 
Before the last day Obama had a speech about how the world needs to stand together and come 
to an agreement and that the US will and needs to take their responsibility. Even if this speech 
would help them to get the agreement needed we think that it was too late in to the conference 
and that it was impossible to take the next step towards a green future.  
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6 DISCUSSION 
We will now discuss our findings in relation to the two research questions, as well as outline 
potential issues concerning the chosen methodology. Additionally, ideas for future research are 
also presented. 
6.1 EVENT-STUDY RESULTS 
When we chose the CARs to investigate we wanted events were the new information that got 
released to the public would affect how the participants act on the market. For example, we 
thought that when The Danish text was leaked some participants would sell their solar stocks. 
This is because we assume that the market is efficient, and that the solar portfolios would react 
negatively to a decreased probability of a successful agreement of the conference. Conversely, 
our expectation was that a failure of the conference would be reflected positively in the 
valuation of the coal portfolios. 
As we stated in our analysis we have only one significant CAR-value, which concerns Chinese 
solar during the period coinciding with a period of public protests during COP15. However, 
we are uncertain if we can attribute this effect directly to the protests, since no other portfolio 
show any significant change. The sign of the change for Chinese solar is negative, meaning 
that, if causality is assumed, the protests would have had a negative effect on the valuation on 
the portfolio. The authors believe that a show of popular support for getting to a binding 
agreement should have led to an increase in the value of the solar portfolio. If the protests put 
more pressure on the politicians – increasing the likelihood of an agreement – the expectation 
is that renewable energy sources would be benefitted. From our results, it appears that the 
opposite is true. If we consider the protest to be the only event that would influence the 
portfolio’s value during this period, this means that either (i) the public show of support was 
interpreted being a negative contribution to getting an agreement, or (ii) that an agreement 
would be a negative outcome for solar companies in China. Neither of these alternatives are 
very attractive. Therefore, we are hesitant to attribute the change of the portfolios valuation to 
the public protests during COP15. Other confounding events, external to the environment 
presented in this thesis, are likely to have a been a driver of the change.  
Our one day CARs had some significant effect but we cannot say if they are reliable since we 
are not sure when the information becomes public and the event takes place. It is also possible 
that something affected the markets those days and which had nothing to do with the climate 
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conference. Therefore, we cannot be certain that these observed market effects stem from the 
COP15 conference.  
We think that it could be that these conferences are not the clearest sign that the international 
society are making progress towards climate change mitigation. Perhaps the markets are 
moving towards more sustainable operations on their own: as demand solar increases and 
demand for coal declines, the rent-bearing opportunities of each industry become more 
respectively less attractive. The companies may not have time to wait for politicians to come 
to an agreement before the time for action has already passed. Political actions and 
negotiations, such as the COP15 conference has a role to play, but the immediate day-to-day 
impacts of such multilateral negotiations are perhaps too indistinct to be measurable through 
the event-study methodology. That the world is moving towards climate change mitigation is 
not something that is determined solely through Conference of the Parties, but something that 
is inherent to modern society. To quote Kunelius & Eide (2012): “[Climate change] has 
emerged as an essential discursive element of the global environment in which people, 
institutions and nations act.” 
6.2 EVENTS SELECTED DURING THE COP15 CONFERENCE 
The selection of events for the CAR-windows are largely subjective, as they are chosen based 
on what was believed to be impactful events which would affect the stock market. There could 
be other events that could have had a part in why the conference failed. For example, there 
could have been events prior to the conference starting signalling that the conference was 
poorly planned or prepared, which could have reduced the confidence in the conference’s 
ability to reach an agreement. However, if there were events during the conference which were 
not included in the study, we do not believe that those events would lead to more significant 
results than the ones presented in this thesis. There were many factors that affected the 
outcome, and we believe that it was not just one specific day that solidified the outcome of the 
conference. 
6.3 EVENT-STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Event studies does not have a clear and fixed methodology, differing significantly from author 
to author. There is continuous argumentation for why one method should be picked above 
another. However, we have found that minor alterations seem to have a low effect on the end 
results. We decided to use the market adjusted returns to calculate the predicted values of our 
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stocks instead of using the mean adjusted returns mostly because what we have found the 
market adjusted model produces more powerful results. We have also had trouble finding 
literature that use event studies the same way we intend to, i.e. to analyse the effect on a 
temporally limited political event. 
To ensure that the test has sufficient power to find abnormal effect, the number of securities 
included in the portfolios should be quite high. However, our search for companies to include 
in the four portfolios did not produce a large sample size. Either our methodology for finding 
the companies were flawed, or the number of companies in these industries are too limited. For 
the solar portfolios, the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of companies could also stem 
from the industry being fairly new, especially in 2009 when the COP15 conference took place. 
Equally, the coal industry might also have some factors which limits the number of available 
companies. In the United States of America, the market is mature, where smaller coal producers 
have been acquired by larger ones. Thus, the number of available companies for us to study are 
reduced. In China, we did find a decent number of companies through our methodology. 
However, the issue in this market is that some of the largest companies are state-owned, which 
disqualifies them from being included in this study. 
Another instance which reduces the power of our test is the presence of event clustering. In 
event studies, such clustering reduces the power of the test. Clustering is when you have events 
which affect all securities of the portfolio at the same time. Since we look at the same event 
but for different stocks, clustering is unavoidable. Unfortunately, we cannot escape this: even 
if we use more stocks the clustering will still be there and effect our tests' power. Some authors 
suggest using non-parametric tests, or making other more advanced adjustments as a way to 
increase the power of the event study. 
Initially, we only had the longer estimation window. However, the proximity of the 2007–2008 
financial crash caused uncertainty whether this longer estimation window would include too 
many negative effects which could depress the normal returns during the event window. 
Therefore, we elected to include a shorter estimation window as well, positioning this as close 
as possible to the event itself. Comparing the results from the two estimation windows, we can 
see that we have more significant results from the short estimation window. Attributing this to 
either the financial crash, or to the lesser number of days included to form a benchmark, is not 
trivial. 
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Because of the fact that we assume that the stock market has Semistrong-form of efficiency, 
every participant will know and act as best as possible with the information they have and 
everyone knows the public information. Unfortunately, some participants will have obtained 
private information which they can act on: they could for example have a source at the 
conference that tells them what is going on before the media has reported it to the public. To 
observe this, we added one day before the events we wanted to examine in our CARs just to 
catch the leaked information. We also wanted to add a couple of days after the events since it 
could take some time before the participants understand the information i.e. it takes some time 
before the information is public. 
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the future, we think it would have been interesting to see if our results match those from 
other countries or regions. We would have liked to see how other developed countries' markets 
behaved. Markets in Europe would have been interesting to observe, as these countries often 
try to position themselves as progressive in relation to issues about climate change. In addition, 
Germany would be interesting to include for its historic reliance on coal, but current leadership 
in solar power deployment. In addition, aggregating securities across 
 the EU can potentially provide many separate securities. Other countries that would have been 
rewarding to observe could be other developing countries, such as Brazil, Russia, and perhaps 
in particular India. We also believe that this type of research can be expanded to other industries 
beyond solar and coal. Some examples could be wind-energy, hydro-power, oil or natural gas. 
Lastly studying other climate conferences would be very rewarding, if there was research 
observing the Paris Agreement or the Kyoto Protocol or just other days in this conference it 
could be possible to understand how these conferences effect the market.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was: To investigate if the 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference had any noticeable impact on the valuation of companies in the coal & solar 
industries in China and the United States of America. 
None of the four portfolios we chose to investigate yielded any significant results that can be 
used to support the claim that the outcome of the 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference had an effect on the markets. One significant effect (at the ten percent level) was 
found with a negative effect for the Chinese solar portfolio during the period of heavy protest 
during the conference. However, the effects were contrary to what the authors believe intuitive: 
clear public support for climate change mitigation action would be a positive effect for 
renewable energy industries. Therefore, we are hesitant in attributing the effect to the studied 
events during COP15. When controlling for the effect, this study could not find any colluding 
effects during the same time period.  
The authors believe that the results of large multilateral negotiation on climate change has little 
direct impact on the valuation of companies in the industries assumed related to climate change. 
These conferences do play a role in the long term, but the changes are likely very granular 
when looking at the day-to-day valuation of companies. It seems more plausible that the 
growing demand for cleaner products & energy sources is exerting pressure on the industries, 
establishing a momentum of change. 
It seems as it was not just one major singular event during the 2009 United Nations Climate 
Change Conference that to led to the politicians not coming to a binding agreement. We believe 
that a series of unfortunate events, combined with poor planning and preparatory work, all lead 
to the conference ending without an agreement, and thus being described to be a failure. 
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APPENDIX 
I. COMPANIES IN PORTFOLIO: US COAL 
Table 12 - Companies in portfolio: US Coal 
Country Industry Ticker Name 
US Coal ACIIQ / ARCH / ACI Arch Coal INC 
US Coal ANRZQ (Delisted) Alpha Natural resources INC 
US Coal ARLP Alliance resource Partners LP 
US Coal BTUUQ (Delisted) Peabody energy 
US Coal CNX Consol  energy INC. 
US Coal ICO US International Coal Group Inc 
US Coal JRCCQ US James River Coal Company 
US Coal MEE US Massey Energy Company 
US Coal NRP US Natural resource partners 
US Coal PCXCQ Patriot Coal Corporation 
US Coal WLB US Dakota Westmoreland corp 
US Coal WLTGQ US Walter energy  
II. COMPANIES IN PORTFOLIO: US SOLAR 
Table 13 - Companies in portfolio: US Solar 
Country Industry Ticker Name 
US Solar ASTI US Ascent Solar Technologies 
US Solar FSLR US First Solar Inc. 
US Solar GTATQ US GT Advanced Tech 
US Solar RGSE US Real Goods Solar (RGS) Energy 
US Solar RNWEF US REC Silicon ASA 
US Solar SPIR US Equity Spire US Equity 
US Solar SPWR US SunPower 
US Solar SUNEQ SunEdison INC 
US Solar WEST US 
Equity 
ANDALAY SOLAR Inc 
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III. COMPANIES IN PORTFOLIO: CHINESE COAL 
Table 14 - Companies in portfolio: Chinese Coal 
Country Industry Ticker Name 
China Coal 000552 CH Gansu Jingyuan 
China Coal 000723 CH Shanxi Meijin 
China Coal 000780 CH Inner Mongolia Pingzhuang Energy Co Ltd 
China Coal 000937 CH Jizhong Energy Resources Co Ltd 
China Coal 000968 CH Taiyuan Coal gasification 
China Coal 000983 CH Shanxi Xishan 
China Coal 002128 CH Huolinhe opencut coal industry 
China Coal 1088 HK China Shenhua Energy  
China Coal 1171 HK Yanzhuo Coal mining 
China Coal 1898 HK China Coal energy company 
China Coal 600098 CH Guangzhou Development Group Inc 
China Coal 600121 CH Zhangzhou Coal Industry & Electric Power Co Ltd 
China Coal 600348 CH Yang Quan Coal Industry 
China Coal 600395 CH Guizhuo Panjia 
China Coal 600397 CH Anyuan Coal Industry Group Co Ltd 
China Coal 600508 CH Shanghai Datun Energy Resources Co Ltd 
China Coal 600546 CH Shanxi coal international energy group 
China Coal 600971 CH Anhui Hengyuan-A 
China Coal 600997 CH Kailuan energy-A 
China Coal 601001 CH Datong Coal Industry 
China Coal 601666 CH Pingdingshan 
China Coal 601699 CH Shanxi Lu'an Environmental Energy Development 
China Coal 601918 CH China Coal Xinji Energy 
China Coal 900948 CH Inner Mongolia Yitai Coal Co ltd 
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IV. COMPANIES IN PORTFOLIO: CHINESE SOLAR 
Table 15 - Companies in portfolio: Chinese Solar 
Country Industry Ticker Name 
China Solar 002218 CH Shenzhen Topra 
China Solar 155 HK China solar energy holdings limited 
China Solar 3800 HK GCL Poly Energy 
China Solar 757 HK Solargiga Energy Holdings Ltd 
China Solar CSUNY US China Sunergy 
China Solar JASO US JA Solar Holdings Co Ltd 
China Solar LDKYQ US LDK Solar CO 
China Solar SOL US Renesola LTD 
China Solar TSL US Trina Solar Ltd 
China Solar YGE US Yingli Green Energy 
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V. POST-EVENT ONE-DAY CAR VALUES, US COAL  
Table 16 - Post-event one-day CAR values, US Coal 
Portfolio US-C Short est. Window Long est. Window 
Date Event day CAR T-value P-value CAR T-value P-value 
2010-02-01 31 0.227 1.31 0.190 0.22 0.72 0.469 
2010-01-29 30 -0.513 -2.96 0.003*** -0.54 -1.78 0.075* 
2010-01-28 29 0.198 1.14 0.253 0.17 0.55 0.584 
2010-01-27 28 -0.181 -1.04 0.296 -0.20 -0.64 0.521 
2010-01-26 27 0.079 0.46 0.646 0.06 0.18 0.855 
2010-01-25 26 0.052 0.30 0.763 0.04 0.12 0.904 
2010-01-22 25 0.163 0.94 0.345 0.12 0.40 0.688 
2010-01-21 24 -0.208 -1.20 0.228 -0.25 -0.81 0.419 
2010-01-20 23 -0.007 -0.04 0.966 -0.04 -0.12 0.903 
2010-01-19 22 -0.005 -0.03 0.978 -0.01 -0.04 0.967 
2010-01-18 21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2010-01-15 20 -0.007 -0.04 0.967 -0.04 -0.12 0.903 
2010-01-14 19 -0.169 -0.98 0.328 -0.19 -0.61 0.540 
2010-01-13 18 -0.074 -0.43 0.667 -0.09 -0.28 0.778 
2010-01-12 17 0.172 0.99 0.321 0.14 0.47 0.638 
2010-01-11 16 -0.121 -0.70 0.484 -0.14 -0.46 0.648 
2010-01-08 15 0.188 1.08 0.278 0.17 0.56 0.575 
2010-01-07 14 -0.107 -0.62 0.538 -0.12 -0.40 0.688 
2010-01-06 13 0.412 2.38 0.017** 0.39 1.29 0.198 
2010-01-05 12 0.274 1.58 0.114 0.26 0.84 0.399 
2010-01-04 11 0.265 1.53 0.126 0.26 0.86 0.392 
2010-01-01 10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2009-12-31 9 0.071 0.41 0.680 0.04 0.14 0.891 
2009-12-30 8 -0.075 -0.43 0.666 -0.09 -0.31 0.757 
2009-12-29 7 -0.111 -0.64 0.523 -0.13 -0.43 0.666 
2009-12-28 6 -0.068 -0.39 0.696 -0.09 -0.28 0.777 
2009-12-25 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2009-12-24 4 -0.055 -0.32 0.749 -0.07 -0.23 0.819 
2009-12-23 3 0.341 1.97 0.049** 0.32 1.06 0.289 
2009-12-22 2 0.205 1.19 0.236 0.19 0.62 0.535 
2009-12-21 1 -0.113 -0.65 0.514 -0.12 -0.40 0.688 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
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VI. POST-EVENT ONE-DAY CAR VALUES, US SOLAR 
Table 17 - Post-event one-day CAR values, US Solar 
Portfolio US-S Short est. Window Long est. Window 
Date Event day CAR T-value P-value CAR T-value P-value 
2010-02-01 31 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2010-01-29 30 -0.041 -0.20 0.838 -0.06 -0.18 0.853 
2010-01-28 29 -0.164 -0.82 0.414 -0.19 -0.59 0.558 
2010-01-27 28 -0.063 -0.31 0.755 -0.07 -0.22 0.823 
2010-01-26 27 0.081 0.40 0.686 0.09 0.27 0.786 
2010-01-25 26 0.021 0.11 0.915 0.01 0.04 0.967 
2010-01-22 25 -0.445 -2.21 0.027** -0.45 -1.43 0.152 
2010-01-21 24 -0.105 -0.52 0.601 -0.13 -0.40 0.690 
2010-01-20 23 -0.175 -0.87 0.386 -0.16 -0.52 0.605 
2010-01-19 22 0.034 0.17 0.865 0.01 0.04 0.970 
2010-01-18 21 0.032 0.16 0.872 0.01 0.03 0.977 
2010-01-15 20 -0.229 -1.13 0.256 -0.25 -0.79 0.431 
2010-01-14 19 -0.164 -0.81 0.416 -0.20 -0.62 0.536 
2010-01-13 18 -0.018 -0.09 0.927 -0.01 -0.02 0.984 
2010-01-12 17 -0.348 -1.73 0.084* -0.39 -1.21 0.225 
2010-01-11 16 0.051 0.25 0.799 0.03 0.08 0.933 
2010-01-08 15 0.050 0.25 0.805 0.03 0.09 0.926 
2010-01-07 14 -0.058 -0.29 0.774 -0.06 -0.18 0.855 
2010-01-06 13 0.170 0.84 0.398 0.16 0.50 0.616 
2010-01-05 12 0.285 1.41 0.158 0.25 0.80 0.425 
2010-01-04 11 0.260 1.29 0.197 0.25 0.79 0.430 
2010-01-01 10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2009-12-31 9 -0.059 -0.29 0.771 -0.08 -0.26 0.796 
2009-12-30 8 -0.117 -0.58 0.560 -0.15 -0.48 0.632 
2009-12-29 7 0.317 1.58 0.115 0.29 0.92 0.360 
2009-12-28 6 -0.080 -0.40 0.691 -0.11 -0.36 0.719 
2009-12-25 5 -0.047 -0.24 0.814 -0.06 -0.20 0.844 
2009-12-24 4 -0.050 -0.25 0.803 -0.10 -0.30 0.764 
2009-12-23 3 0.010 0.05 0.960 -0.02 -0.05 0.958 
2009-12-22 2 0.173 0.86 0.390 0.18 0.56 0.577 
2009-12-21 1 0.292 1.45 0.148 0.27 0.85 0.396 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
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VII. POST-EVENT ONE-DAY CAR VALUES, CHINESE COAL 
Table 18 - Post-event one-day CAR values, Chinese Coal 
Portfolio C-C 
 
Short est. Window Long est. Window 
Date Event day CAR T-value P-value CAR T-value P-value 
2010-02-01 31 -0.443 -1.64 0.101 -0.496 -1.37 0.171 
2010-01-29 30 -0.171 -0.63 0.528 -0.192 -0.53 0.596 
2010-01-28 29 0.061 0.23 0.822 0.034 0.09 0.924 
2010-01-27 28 0.315 1.17 0.244 0.275 0.76 0.448 
2010-01-26 27 -0.233 -0.86 0.389 -0.286 -0.79 0.429 
2010-01-25 26 0.087 0.32 0.748 0.048 0.13 0.895 
2010-01-22 25 -0.372 -1.38 0.169 -0.409 -1.13 0.259 
2010-01-21 24 -0.513 -1.90 0.058* -0.525 -1.45 0.147 
2010-01-20 23 -0.038 -0.14 0.888 -0.102 -0.28 0.778 
2010-01-19 22 0.079 0.29 0.771 0.055 0.15 0.878 
2010-01-18 21 -0.188 -0.69 0.487 -0.201 -0.55 0.579 
2010-01-15 20 -0.093 -0.34 0.732 -0.111 -0.31 0.760 
2010-01-14 19 -0.270 -1.00 0.318 -0.271 -0.75 0.455 
2010-01-13 18 -0.102 -0.38 0.707 -0.165 -0.46 0.649 
2010-01-12 17 -0.439 -1.62 0.105 -0.430 -1.19 0.236 
2010-01-11 16 -0.333 -1.23 0.218 -0.351 -0.97 0.333 
2010-01-08 15 -0.366 -1.35 0.176 -0.389 -1.07 0.284 
2010-01-07 14 0.092 0.34 0.734 0.040 0.11 0.912 
2010-01-06 13 0.305 1.13 0.260 0.264 0.73 0.466 
2010-01-05 12 0.412 1.52 0.127 0.399 1.10 0.271 
2010-01-04 11 0.159 0.59 0.558 0.119 0.33 0.742 
2010-01-01 10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2009-12-31 9 -0.230 -0.85 0.394 -0.254 -0.70 0.483 
2009-12-30 8 -0.503 -1.86 0.063* -0.501 -1.38 0.167 
2009-12-29 7 -0.150 -0.55 0.580 -0.162 -0.45 0.655 
2009-12-28 6 -0.134 -0.50 0.620 -0.132 -0.36 0.715 
2009-12-25 5 -0.023 -0.08 0.933 -0.054 -0.15 0.882 
2009-12-24 4 0.422 1.56 0.119 0.437 1.21 0.228 
2009-12-23 3 0.049 0.18 0.856 0.033 0.09 0.927 
2009-12-22 2 -0.444 -1.64 0.101 -0.509 -1.40 0.161 
2009-12-21 1 -0.171 -0.63 0.527 -0.185 -0.51 0.609 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
  
X 
 
VIII. POST-EVENT ONE-DAY CAR VALUES, CHINESE SOLAR 
Table 19 - Post-event one-day CAR values, Chinese Solar 
Portfolio C-S 
 
Short est. Window Long est. Window 
Date Event day CAR T-value P-value CAR T-value P-value 
2010-02-01 31 0.169 0.81 0.416 0.15 0.43 0.669 
2010-01-29 30 -0.052 -0.25 0.801 -0.10 -0.28 0.781 
2010-01-28 29 0.046 0.22 0.826 -0.01 -0.03 0.979 
2010-01-27 28 -0.299 -1.44 0.150 -0.33 -0.96 0.336 
2010-01-26 27 0.169 0.81 0.418 0.14 0.40 0.692 
2010-01-25 26 0.180 0.86 0.387 0.15 0.44 0.659 
2010-01-22 25 -0.260 -1.25 0.211 -0.32 -0.93 0.351 
2010-01-21 24 -0.056 -0.27 0.787 -0.11 -0.31 0.756 
2010-01-20 23 0.052 0.25 0.802 0.01 0.03 0.978 
2010-01-19 22 -0.203 -0.97 0.330 -0.23 -0.67 0.505 
2010-01-18 21 -0.032 -0.16 0.876 -0.05 -0.13 0.894 
2010-01-15 20 -0.164 -0.79 0.429 -0.21 -0.62 0.537 
2010-01-14 19 -0.394 -1.90 0.058* -0.43 -1.25 0.213 
2010-01-13 18 -0.147 -0.71 0.478 -0.17 -0.49 0.627 
2010-01-12 17 -0.158 -0.76 0.449 -0.20 -0.59 0.555 
2010-01-11 16 0.135 0.65 0.517 0.10 0.29 0.772 
2010-01-08 15 0.079 0.38 0.705 0.05 0.13 0.894 
2010-01-07 14 -0.120 -0.58 0.563 -0.15 -0.44 0.661 
2010-01-06 13 0.222 1.07 0.286 0.18 0.54 0.591 
2010-01-05 12 0.315 1.51 0.130 0.28 0.81 0.421 
2010-01-04 11 0.162 0.78 0.437 0.14 0.42 0.673 
2010-01-01 10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2009-12-31 9 0.010 0.05 0.960 -0.04 -0.13 0.900 
2009-12-30 8 -0.093 -0.45 0.655 -0.13 -0.37 0.709 
2009-12-29 7 -0.026 -0.12 0.902 -0.06 -0.18 0.854 
2009-12-28 6 0.105 0.50 0.615 0.07 0.21 0.835 
2009-12-25 5 -0.001 -0.01 0.996 -0.01 -0.02 0.986 
2009-12-24 4 -0.057 -0.28 0.783 -0.09 -0.26 0.793 
2009-12-23 3 0.077 0.37 0.710 0.04 0.12 0.906 
2009-12-22 2 -0.085 -0.41 0.682 -0.12 -0.35 0.724 
2009-12-21 1 0.139 0.67 0.504 0.12 0.35 0.728 
* 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level 
 
